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Abstract
In  2007,  the  US  Transportation  Security  Administration  agency  said  Boeing  would  use  its 
Monte Carlo simulation model “to identify U.S. commercial aviation system vulnerabilities 
against a wide variety of attack scenarios.” The Boeing and TSA team that crafted the model 
said that because of the Monte Carlo method’s success, the agency is considering extending its 
use to the analysis of policy problems outside the realm of security. 
Perplexed by the complexity implied by the above announcement, I started looking for simpler 
ways of achieving the TSA objectives. Here are some of the conclusions.
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Introduction
The challenges to value creation in dynamic networks (the “eco-systems”) are 
significant and interrelated: 
• (In)ability to envision the desired outcome: implementing change swiftly 
but with confidence requires a shared vision and its effective communication, 
• uncertainty:  the  difficulties  are  compounded  by  the  uncertainties. 
Traditional  approaches  to  the  planning  rely  for  their  success  on  accurate 
predictions of the future, 
• (In)ability to create and maintain momentum: ties linking the eco-system’s 
participants  are  increasingly  fluid.  Conventional  governance  arrangements 
intended to steer your changes are not applicable.
Action-Oriented Enterprise 
A SWIFT JOURNEY FROM A SINGLE SCENARIO VIA MULTIPLE 
SCENARIOS TO THE SYNTHESIS FOR ACTION 
I briefly summarise very specific and systematic improvements to the ways 
stakeholders can carefully plan and then decisively act ahead of high impact 
events (desirable or not). These improvements do not make up just another 
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‘method’ but, instead, constitute a comprehensive ‘Toolbox’, with some of the 
‘tools’ in atypical roles. 
The approach is hard to implement only in that it requires understanding 
of a number of  ‘tools’; the real difficulty is inherent in the problem we are 
trying to solve. I have observed that even the most renowned generalists 
have not managed to cover planning under low levels of predictability in its 
entirety!
Insuring against probable high impact events (e.g. current ‘credit crunch’) has 
been, at best, very difficult and, at worst, undesirable: in a 1939 letter, J.von 
Neumann wrote: “I refuse to accept, however, the stupidity of stock exchange 
boys as an explanation of the trend in stocks”. Therefore, the Toolbox contains 
compelling techniques for establishing a rigorous governance framework. (For 
example, the emerging dominance of the ‘universal’ banking model requires a 
judicious management of regulated versus unregulated business lines). 
The importance of such a governance framework is in being able to approve – 
in an objective manner - the plans for action well ahead of high impact events. 
The traditional planning methods are based on the  belief that external 
events and internal actions can be predicted ‘sufficiently’ accurately and, 
thereafter, useful plans-for-future drawn up. 
What if predicting the future turns out to be much, much harder than we believe 
? According to D.Deutsch, it is “.. impossible to extrapolate observations unless 
one has already placed them within an explanatory framework. For example, in 
order to 'induce' its false prediction, B.Russell's chicken must first have had in 
mind a false explanation of the farmer's behaviour.” 
Scenario Planning (SP) already  improves  the  reality in some Industries, 
by  allowing  for  multiple  alternatives  to  the  single  prediction. 
Conventionally, SP is used as a form of Risk Management (RM). It frequently 
lacks  substance.  Experiences  of Shell  prove  the  most  used  SP  technique  is 
brainstorming. Apparently, there is very little planning: too much reliance on 
‘shallow’ making up of scenarios (almost as if uncertainty requires fewer skills 
and  precision  than  ‘certainty’),  and  insufficient  follow-through  to  get  right 
actions  formulated  and  initiated.  Worse  still,  SP  very  rarely  involves  a 
synthesis of results of any follow-throughs; i.e. individual conclusions are 
not  being  combined  into  a  coherent  picture,  an    “action  map”.  This  is 
where the greatest loss of opportunity occurs. 
Our  improvements  can  be  summarised  as  providing  the  stakeholders  with  a 
Toolbox to synthesise the follow-throughs from SP. SP will immensely benefit 
from the notion of business-oriented service architecture (BOSA, a business 
‘counterpart’ of SOA, service-oriented architecture now prevalent in IT): we 
view an enterprise as a network of internal and external  business services that 
require an objective  method of prioritising and allocating capital. Governments 
and regulators are increasingly powerful contributors to such an eco-system. 
Remember that within a matter of months we have gone from a system where 
586Interdisciplinary Management Research V 
central banks acted as a lender of last resort to one where central banks are the 
main  provider  of  liquidity  to  all  banks.  Furthermore,  governments  and 
regulators have the historical data they try to use to influence the future.
BOSA  /  SOA  can  be  an  important  tool  in  aligning  business  changes, 
management responsibilities and IT programmes; it is rigorous but intuitive. It 
gives  stakeholders  the  expressive  power  to  communicate  more  precisely  in 
order to synthesise and act, swiftly but with confidence. In  whatever we do, 
including any improvements to the governance arrangements, we first precisely 
design service interactions. Thus swiftly visualising the essential business scope 
and pinpointing problem areas within it. Here is an example of a BOSA we 
developed  for  an  innovative  credit  card  issuer.  The  Cardholder  uses  her/his 
mobile phone in order to confirm that an electronic Direct Debit payment may 
take place, thus retaining a level of control: 
Direct Debit Services Direct Debit Services
Billing  Services Billing  Services






Arrows  point  to  the  service  providers;  thus  unambiguously  conveying 
responsibilities in the eco-system, .e.g. Direct Debit Services collect balances, 
Cardholders  confirm  payments,  etc.  Contrast  that  clarity  with  the  following 
extract from the parliamentary investigation into the collapse of Barings Bank: 
6.86 H. told us that responsibility for reconciliation was:
  "very  unclear.  You  could  say  that  it  was  a  finance  function 
responsibility;  you  could  say  that  it  was  a  Futures  and  Options  Settlements 
responsibility; you could say it was a Treasury responsibility... 
6.87 B. told us that in his opinion the: 
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  "responsibility for reconciliation lay ... I would have expected it to be in 
Singapore  rather  than  in  London.  As  between  the  treasury  desk  and  the 
settlements desk in London, I do not have a view as to…” 
Business priorities change and therefore your risks will vary. SP requires an 
effective RM: SP practitioners should plan to effectively compete under each of 
the scenarios; they should repeatedly answer the question “If I knew the future 
were going to turn out like this, what would my risk-adjusted response be?” 
The  goal  is  not  to  respond  to  uncertainty  by  merely  replacing  one  loose 
prediction with several in-depth studies. Rather, the range of scenarios serves to 
judiciously map out “the space within which the future(s) might fall”. Easier 
said than done… But it needs to be done to enable a meaningful synthesis for 
action, as follows: 
A crucial outcome of applying business services concepts must be a flexible 
BOSA that would enable stakeholders to act decisively now, to cost-effectively 
prepare for uncertainty. BOSA will also allow them to respond swiftly later, 
every time when the expected or unexpected  events occur, because they will be 
well prepared ‘all’ the time. 
The ‘required’ BOSA – derived through a comparison of risk-adjusted business 
plans - will identify the core and contingent services. This step is not entirely 
unlike  the  attempts  by  L.Wilkinson.  In  “How  to  Build  Scenarios”  he  says: 
“Some of the decisions [italics by R.Erl] we make today will make sense across 
‘all’ of the futures. Others will make sense only in one or two. Once we've 
identified those implications that work in all of the scenarios, we get on with 
them in the confidence that we're making better, more robust plans”. 
However,  I  have  very  serious  doubts  about  the  precision,  and  therefore 
usefulness,  of  ‘decisions’  for  the  purpose  of  the  synthesis  for  action.
Uncertainty requires more skills and precision than ‘certainty’. Wilkinson and 
the textbooks have never recognised the vital ‘glue’ provided by: 
• the  notion  of  business  services,  that  makes  comparison  of  plans  truly 
possible, and 
• risk-adjusted i.e. credible individual business plans.
Thereafter, the core services – those appearing in a majority of plans - must be 
acquired  whatever shape the future might take. This means that stakeholders 
have to act now regardless of uncertainties.
The  contingent  services  -  those  appearing  in  a  minority  of  plans  -  can  be 
structured and pre-approved now. Then they could be managed as real options. 
Thus giving stakeholders a head start if and when it becomes imperative. This 
means that stakeholders can act now in spite of uncertainty, so that they can 
later respond swiftly. 
Structuring a real option would hedge  the strategic risk of not following the 
BOSA implied by a scenario. Exercising a real option would alter the ‘current’ 
BOSA to the ‘next’ BOSA that will include the contingent service(s) arising 
from the real option. 
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I have not included examples showing that from a small number of scenarios a 
much bigger number of altered states can be derived and thereafter be supported 
with contingent services.
Conclusions
Uncertainty is an opportunity for those who are well prepared. In unpredictable 
situations it is the speed of response - utilising ‘pre-approved’  solutions - that 
can  confer  a  strong  competitive  advantage;  management  reaction  can  never 
match  proactive  action  towards  an  uncertain  future.  In  other  words,  the 
stakeholders’ Toolbox must enable them to align disruptive business changes, 
governance  arrangements,  and  management  responsibilities  for  risks  to 
operations or programmes of work. 
I refer to the Toolbox as being ‘action-oriented’ because we have a focus on 
acting  now,  based  on  plans  for  effective  responses  to  ever  changing  and 
unpredictable political, environmental, market or regulatory conditions:
• actions you have to take now regarding your core services, and 
• actions  you  should  take  now  as  a  means  of  preparing  your  contingent 
services.
However, an effective identification of core and contingent services is only 
possible  if  the  individual  plans  are  rigorous  and  based  on  an  objective 
approach to risk. Conversely, the traditional risk methods may add value once 
the “future space” has been judiciously broken down into scenarios that are, 
taken collectively, representative of the future(s). 
An important by-product of our approach can be derived from articulation 
of  typical  service  aggregations  -  “business  service  patterns”  (e.g.  TSA 
‘policies’).  They  can  offer  both  efficient  and  consistent  service-based 
answers to similar questions that may appear in several business plans.
There exist remarkable similarities between the current “sharp discontinuities”, 
for  example  in  airline  industry  and  banking,  and  the  shocks  in  computing 
industry  over  the  last  two  decades.  Whilst  some  Industries  have  eventually 
found  appropriate business models (e.g. “open architecture” in computing), a 
typical  enterprise  would  miss  major  opportunities  by  relying  solely  on  the 
corrective strength of regulators and/or competitive market forces: a flexible 
business architecture can be created, in many Industries, in such a way that it 
articulates  a  way  forward  around  core  services  and  affordable  contingent 
services,  thus  commoditising  and  leveraging  the  latter.  This  requires  less 
‘stupidity of stock exchange boys’, and a very careful dose of internal oversight 
and external regulation. 
According to J.Wisbey, CEO of Lombard Risk “we now face calls for a new 
world  order  and  this  will  be  determined  largely  by  politicians  and  policy 
makers. The real danger is that there will be a backlash against bankers for 
causing the whole crisis when in reality politicians and regulators must share 
589Interdisciplinary Management Research V 
some of the blame. Individual institutions can never have the same ability to 
gather information as the authorities in a country who gather information from 
all banks and market participants. Governments and regulators are powerful. 
They have access to information, they can guide and if necessary they can arm-
twist.”
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